The Franchising Dilemma: Franchisor Liability for Actions of a Local Franchisee by Hanson, Randall K.
North Carolina Central Law Review
Volume 19
Number 2 Volume 19, Number 2 Article 5
4-1-1991
The Franchising Dilemma: Franchisor Liability for
Actions of a Local Franchisee
Randall K. Hanson
Follow this and additional works at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by History and Scholarship Digital Archives. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Central Law Review by an authorized editor of History and Scholarship Digital Archives. For more information, please contact jbeeker@nccu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hanson, Randall K. (1991) "The Franchising Dilemma: Franchisor Liability for Actions of a Local Franchisee," North Carolina Central
Law Review: Vol. 19 : No. 2 , Article 5.
Available at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol19/iss2/5
THE FRANCHISING DILEMMA: FRANCHISOR




Domino's Pizza has a franchise policy of thirty minute delivery.
While trying to complete a timely delivery, a local pizza delivery driver
runs a red light, striking and injuring a pedestrian. Should the national
franchisor have any liability for the injuries of the victim? It is estimated
that there are approximately 100 lawsuits pending against Domino's in-
cluding lawsuits involving twenty fatalities.'
A husband and a wife checking into a locally owned Holiday Inn in
North Carolina are assaulted and robbed. The couple assumed the motel
was owned by Holiday Inn when, in fact, it was a locally owned
franchise. Should Holiday Inn, as franchisor, have any liability for the
injuries since they failed to indicate to the guests that the motel was lo-
cally owned and operated?2 Lawsuits against nationally known
franchisors such as Domino's and Holiday Inn are becoming more and
more common.
Franchising is a business format which will dominate the business
world for years to come. For a fee, national franchisors provide to local
franchisees expertise involving a product or a service, national advertis-
ing, and name recognition.3 Franchisees typically pay a franchise fee to
purchase the franchise rights and also agree to purchase all necessary
products from the franchisor or an approved supplier pursuant to an ex-
" B.S./B.A. 1976, J.D. 1979, University of North Dakota; LL.M. 1987, Southern Methodist
University; Associate Professor of Business Law, University of North Carolina at Wilmington.
1. Sargent, Domino's Quick Delivery: Public Safety v. Profits, 25 TRIAL 16 (Nov. 1989). The
author states:
Domino's Pizza guarantees a delivery within 30 minutes of the order. If not, Domino's will
give the customer a free pizza or refund $3, depending on where the customer lives.
Many trial lawyers contend that delivering pizzas hot costs too much in life and limb. At
least 100 suits are pending against the company. Claimants allege that Domino's drivers, many
of them young and inexperienced, have injured them or killed their family members in their
rush to be good employees and back up the guarantee.
Id.
2. See Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 844 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1988).
3. See Pitegoff, Franchise Relationship Laws: A Minefield for Franchisors, 45 Bus. L. 289
(1989); Annotation, Vicarious Liability of Private Franchisor, 81 A.L.R.3d 764 (1977); Cote,
Franchisor's Liability for Acts of Franchisee, 39 Am. Jur. 699 (1984).
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clusive dealing contract.4 Fast food franchises are certainly the most
common types of franchises, but other common examples include hotels,
car dealerships, weight loss clinics, travel agencies, soft-drink distribu-
tors, and real estate agencies. Since franchisor-franchisee business orga-
nizations have exploded in numbers, it is not surprising that there have
been increasing numbers of lawsuits being filed against franchisors by
injured third parties.
Often a customer of a local franchisee who is injured at a local
franchise establishment will be satisfied to pursue a claim against the lo-
cal franchisee rather than seeking to recover from the national
franchisor. If the victim is harmed by an insolvent or underinsured fran-
chisee, the victim may well look to the franchisor for recovery. When
should the franchisor be held responsible for the actions of a local fran-
chisee? The franchisor is faced with a dilemma. The franchisor is forced
to exert some control over the franchisee to guarantee that the local fran-
chisee provides a consistent high quality service or product and to pro-
tect the franchisor's trademark.5 However, if the franchisor is deemed to
have exerted too much control, then the franchisor risks having the
franchisor-franchisee relationship treated as an agency relationship re-
sulting in franchisor liability for the actions of the franchisee. A number
of interesting cases have been decided in recent years involving
franchisor liability for local franchisee actions. Some of the franchisors
which have been sued include such common names as Ramada Inn,6
Holiday Inn,7 Nutri/System,8 Dairy Queen,9 Kentucky Fried Chicken, t°
4. See, e.g., Broock v. Nutri/System, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Ohio 1986); Singleton v. Inter-
national Dairy Queen, Inc., 332 A.2d 160 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975).
Franchise fees and projected total investments for some common franchises discussed below are as
follows:
Franchise Franchise Fee Total Investment
Dairy Queen $25,000 $400,000-$450,000
Domino's Pizza $1,000-3,000 $75,000-$150,000
$400,000-
Hardee's $15,000 $1,400,000




R. BOND, THE SOURCE BOOK OF FRANCHISE OPPORTUNITIES (1989).
5. See Annotation, Vicarious Liability of Private Franchisor, 81 A.L.R.3d 764 (1977); Monica,
Franchisor Liability to Third Parties, 49 Mo. L. REV. 309 (1984).
6. See, e.g., Hyman v. Ramada Inn, Inc., 86 N.C. App., 274, 357 S.E.2d 394 (1987).
7. See Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 844 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1988); see also Drummond v.
Hilton Hotel Corp., 501 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (motion for summary judgment denied).
8. See also, Broock, 654 F. Supp. at 7.
9. See, e.g., Singleton v. International Dairy Queen, Inc., 332 A.2d 160 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975);
Stanford v. Dairy Queen Products of Texas, 623 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).
10. See, e.g., Wise v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 555 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.H. 1983).
1991]
2
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1991], Art. 5
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol19/iss2/5
192 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:190
BMW," and Canada Dry.' 2 Successful lawsuits against franchisors have
usually been based on agency respondeat superior principles if control is
present or on an apparent agency theory if no control is present.
II. REASONS ASSERTED FOR EXPANDING FRANCHISOR LIABILITY
There are a number of public policy arguments supporting an expan-
sion of franchisor liability. First, many franchises are extremely profita-
ble and the franchisors are better able to cover losses than are innocent
victims. This is commonly referred to as the "deep pocket theory," and
is commonly asserted as a justification for the concept of respondeat su-
perior which imposes liability upon employers for the unauthorized ac-
tions of employees which occur within the scope of employment.' 3 If a
local franchise harms a customer but has insufficient assets to compen-
sate the innocent victim, then perhaps the franchisor who benefits from
the franchise relationship should bear responsibility rather than leave the
victim without recourse. Second, a franchisor typically receives profits
from the actions of a franchisee over the life of the franchise through the
use of exclusive dealings contracts. If the franchisor continues to profit
from the consumption of franchisor supplied products, then the
franchisor can reasonably be expected to shoulder at least a portion of
the liability burden. Third, the franchisor could cover potential liability
by purchasing liability insurance with the proceeds of the profits obtained
by the benefits of the exclusive dealing contracts with the local
franchisees.
Fourth, greater liability could prompt franchisors to more carefully
monitor the actions of the local franchisee. Most franchisors are already
actively involved in a number of aspects of the local franchisees' activities
including site selection, training programs, determining sales prices and
products which will be sold. 4 A manual is typically provided covering
the policy expectations of the franchisor. If liability were expanded, no
doubt franchisors would increase on site inspections for dangerous prac-
tices or situations. This could result in a reduction of injuries suffered by
innocent consumers dealing with franchisees. A legal system which
sometimes imposes liability and which sometimes protects the franchisor
sends a confusing message to franchisors. Frustrated franchisors then
attempt to walk a tightrope whereby they can exercise some control, but
not too much control, to avoid liability. A clear requirement of greater
liability would encourage increased franchisor involvement in business
operations and would potentially result in safer business operations.
11. See, e.g., Cullen v. BMW of North America, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 555 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
12. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Canada Dry, 138 Ga. App. 588, 226 S.E.2d 613 (1976).
13. W. Prosser and W. Keeton, TORTS § 69 (5th ed. 1984).
14. Pitegoff, supra note 3, at 293.
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Finally, the public frequently views local franchises as franchisor enti-
ties and this image is often encouraged by signs, containers, and uniforms
which indicate only the franchisor's name rather than calling attention to
the local franchisee. Franchisors spend large amounts of money in ad-
vertising to build up name recognition and to protect and promote their
trademark.'" Many consumers simply do not realize that franchises are
locally owned. If the franchisor desires to create a national image
through national advertising, then perhaps the franchisor should have
extensive liability for creating this impression.
III. REASONS ASSERTED FOR LIMITING FRANCHISOR LIABILITY
There are also a number of reasons which can be asserted for protect-
ing franchisors from liability. Frequently, if a customer is injured by the
actions of a franchisee, the franchisee is the party at fault, not the
franchisor. Public policy has a legitimate goal of placing the responsibil-
ity for harming another on the party who has caused the harm. In many
cases the injured customer simply has not been harmed by the actions of
the franchisor, because the customer has not dealt with the franchisor.
In these cases arguably the victim should only be able to recover from the
local franchisee whose actions harmed the victim.
Franchisors should be protected because they stimulate the business
economy of our country. 6 A successful franchise operation can create a
tremendous number of jobs across the country. In addition to employing
workers, these businesses also pay property taxes and income taxes. Ar-
guably, this beneficial activity should be protected, encouraged, and fos-
tered rather than burdened with liability pitfalls which could bring the
franchise system to its knees. The number of potential lawsuits against a
national franchisor could be astronomical given the large number of cus-
tomers who come into contact with local franchisees.
Franchises should be encouraged because they frequently bring about
low cost, high quality products and services which are deemed desirable
by consumers. This is particularly true of the more rural areas in the
United States where many types of businesses would not be started with-
out the expertise and encouragement available through the franchising
system.
The imposition of liability upon a franchisor often only provides an
extra "deep pocket" for a victim to pursue. Local franchisees often carry
15. Monica, supra note 5, at 310.
16. See, e.g., Phillips, Liability of Franchisors for the Torts of Their Montana Franchisee, 49
MONT. L. REV. 123, 124 (1988). "The franchising boom continues to occur despite the imposition
of a franchise fee for the rights inherent in using the franchise, which can run to $50,000 or higher
plus the requirement for payment of monthly royalties usually 5-7 percent of the gross, and for
monthly advertising fees." Bocas, Leaving the Corporate Nest-The Franchise Route, 75 NATIONS
Bus. 14, 20 (1987).
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liability insurance coverage and, arguably, franchisor liability is improper
because the local franchisee is adequately equipped to compensate vic-
tims without the imposition of liability on franchisors.
IV. FRANCHISOR LIABILITY
One of the primary assets of a franchise is the trademark which identi-
fies the franchise. Franchisees are willing to spend large amounts of
money to acquire franchise rights if the franchisor's name is widely rec-
ognized and highly regarded by the consuming public. Name recogni-
tion is obviously very important in the competitive business world.
Under the Lanham Act, 17 a trademark owner may license out the right
to use its mark provided the mark is not used in a manner to deceive the
public. II An owner may lose its mark by abandonment if it is not used or
if the manner in which it is used causes the mark to lose its significance
as an indication of its origin.' 9 Therefore, the trademark owner must
regulate the activities of the franchisee to preserve its mark and protect
the public from deceptive uses of the mark. The franchisor has an addi-
tional motivation to closely control local franchisees in that the
franchisor typically seeks to assure that the local franchisee will produce
a uniform, high quality, product or service.
Three legal theories are commonly relied on to hold franchisors liable
for the actions of franchisees: that the franchisor has exerted such exten-
sive control over the franchisee that an agency relationship is deemed
created; that there exists an apparent or ostensible agency; and
negligence.
A. Actual Agency Relationship Based on Control
The cases to date which have held a franchisor liable for the actions of
a franchisee have usually involved situations where the franchisor has
exercised close control over the actions of the franchisee. Important fac-
tors leading to liability have included franchisor determination of wages
and working conditions, franchisor supervision of worker activities or
routines, franchisor involvement in disciplinary actions taken against
franchisee employees, franchisor limitations on products and services to
be offered to the public, and the detailed preparation of an operations
manual.20 The greater the control exerted over the franchisee, the
greater the possibility the courts will find the existence of an agency
relationship.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988).
18. Id. at 1055 (1988).
19. Id. at 1127 (1988).
20. See, e.g., Singleton v. International Dairy Queen, Inc., 332 A.2d 160, 161-63 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1975); Annotation, Vicarious Liability of Private Franchisor, 81 A.L.R.3d 764 (1977).
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One of the first cases where a franchisor failed to avoid liability for
injuries suffered by a customer at a local franchise operation was Single-
ton v. International Dairy Queen, Inc.2 In that 1975 case, a nine year old
customer of a Delaware Dairy Queen franchise was injured as she left the
store. The girl pushed on a metal crossbar on the door to push the door
open, and the bottom portion of the glass in the door broke. The girl fell
on the broken glass and received severe lacerations."2 The local fran-
chisee and the franchisor were both sued. The franchisor sought sum-
mary judgment on the theory that the franchisee was an independent
contractor and as such the franchisor was not responsible for the actions
of the franchisee. Summary judgment was denied as the court felt that
there was a factual question as to whether the franchise relationship con-
stituted a master-servant relationship or an independent contractor rela-
tionship.23 The court noted that there were a number of control factors
present. A critical factor in the case appeared to be the fact that Dairy
Queen (the franchisor) supplied detailed remodeling plans to be followed
by the franchisee.24 Dairy Queen also controlled many details of the
franchise operation including the regulation of the formula for the ice
cream "mix"; approval of uniforms of employees; establishment of the
items to be sold and portions; requirement that all equipment and sup-
plies be purchased from authorized suppliers; regulation of use of the
trademark and the reservation of an inspection right. Dairy Queen also
reserved the right to cancel the franchise if the local franchisee did not
live up to the franchise agreement.25 Although this case merely denied
summary judgment, it caused much concern for franchisors.
In Drummond v. Hilton Hotel Corp. ,26 the plaintiff filed a fall down
suit against a hotel franchisor. Hilton exerted a number of controls over
21. Singleton, 332 A.2d 160.
22. Id. at 161.
23. Dairy Queen argued in its motion for summary judgment that the franchisee was an in-
dependent contractor over whom Dairy Queen exercised "no continual or actual control of the day
to day operations." The court rejected this position stating:
In the instant case, the control exercised by Dairy Queen appears to be excessive. When an
entity can control the size, shape and appearance of its franchisor's establishment, impose the
nationally known sign "Dairy Queen" as the only sign for the premises, require all containers to
show the name of the parent company, dictate portion control, the size and shape of containers,
the uniforms of the employees, subject the franchisor to the obligation to obey subsequent rules
and regulations, reserve the right to inspect the premises (the absence of affirmative remedial
controls, except termination in the event the inspection results are unsatisfactory, proves noth-
ing since what is the right to inspect without the right to remedy), name the suppliers and even
dictate what else may be sold on the premises, there appears little else to establish agency. The
very lifeblood of the agent is in the hands of the franchisor. What greater control can there be
than portion control or the nebulously defined sanction of termination by the unilateral action
of the franchisor.
Id. at 162-63.
24. Id. at 161.
25. Id. at 162.
26. 501 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
1991]
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the franchisee including rights of inspection as well as a requirement that
the fanchisor's name be used in all advertising and promotional materi-
als. Hilton asserted that "at no time did it maintain, own, control, or
operate the hotel".2 Hilton further asserted that the owners of the hotel
had executed a license/franchise agreement with Hilton wherein Hilton
specifically disavowed any agency relationship.2" This contract term was
ignored by the court, and the court held that a factual question existed as
to whether the control present constituted an agency relationship. The
mere denial of a agency relationship in a licensing contract did not re-
lieve Hilton of all potential liability.29
A detailed operating manual may give rise to franchisor liability.
Agency control was found present in the case of Taylor v. Checkrite,
Ltd."3 In this case a local franchised check collection business allegedly
wrongfully listed an individual in a bad check bulletin. The individual
wrongfully listed sued the franchisor. The franchise contract between
the franchisor and franchisee required the franchise to follow a proce-
dures manual which gave the franchisee virtually no discretion in per-
forming the check collection business operation.3 Since the franchisor
became actively involved in the day-to-day operating procedures of the
franchisee, the court held that the franchisee was an agent of the
franchisor and that summary judgment in favor of the franchisor was not
appropriate.32
While there are a number of cases holding a franchisor liable for the
actions of a franchisee because of the exertion of control, there are a large
number of cases wherein a franchisor has been held not responsible for
the actions of a franchisee. One of the first cases decided in the area of
franchisor liability was protective of the franchisor. In McLaughlin v.
27. Id. at 30.
28. Id. at 31.
29. Id. The court stated:
The agreement does have a clause limiting Hilton's liability.., the mere fact that there is an
express denial of the existence of an agency relationship is not in itself determinative of the
matter. Since such a denial of agency is not sufficient to relieve Hilton of all possible liability as
a matter of law, the issue of Hilton's right to control any operations of the hotel is an issue for
jury determination. Id. at 31.
30. 627 F. Supp. 415 (S.D. Ohio 1986).
31. Id. at 417. The court stated:
Examining these contract provisions ... the Court must conclude that Defendant has such
right of control over the franchisee as to make that franchisee its agent in regard to the activities
complained of in this lawsuit. The Procedure Manual provides very detailed, step-by-step direc-
tions to the franchisee in carrying out its business operations, including setting up new accounts
for merchants, member billing, file set-up, receiving mail, check processing, bookkeeping proce-
dures, and preparing the computer listing sheet for the Checkrite Bulletin. The franchisee is
given virtually no discretion in performing these operations. Most importantly for purposes of
this lawsuit, the franchisee under the manual has no discretion in the practices underlying the
allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint.
Id.
32. Id. at 418.
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Chicken Delight, Inc. ," a local franchisee employed a driver who injured
the plaintiff while delivering chicken for the franchisee.34 The plaintiff
sued the franchisor, alleging that the franchise agreement was designed
to control the quality and taste of all the products sold by the franchisee.
The franchisee had to purchase equipment, supplies, and foods from the
franchisor and agree to follow cooking specifications. Location, con-
struction, and remodeling all had to comply with franchisor specifica-
tions.3" The plaintiff also asserted that the franchisor had inspection
rights and that the franchise agreement required the franchisee to
promptly deliver freshly prepared food. The franchisee was required to
maintain a free and adequate delivery system.36 The court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the franchisor, holding that the delivery per-
son was an agent/servant of the franchisee, not the franchisor.37 The
court noted "although the financial interest of Chicken Delight, Inc. is
advanced and the reputation and goodwill of Chicken Delight, Inc. are
enhanced by the delivery of hot Chicken Delight food products, such is
not sufficient to establish a basis for the imposition of liability on Chicken
Delight, Inc."
31
It is interesting to compare the Chicken Delight case with potential
lawsuits against Domino's Pizza. The facts of the Chicken Delight case
are closely akin to claims arising from negligent pizza delivery drivers.
The key factor which sets the Domino's situation apart from the Chicken
Delight situation is the Domino's franchisor policy of a thirty minute
delivery guarantee.39 This policy could very well be a control factor
which could give rise to franchisor liability. Domino's Pizza consists of
approximately 5,100 outlets.' Approximately one-third of the outlets
are company owned. It is estimated that Domino's Pizza relies on 70,000
to 80,000 drivers.4 Allegedly Domino's employs many young drivers.
The combination of potentially immature drivers with time deadlines ar-
guably gives rise to legitimate claims. Domino's asserts that the drivers
are all independent contractors, and, as such, the franchisor is not re-
sponsible for acts of neglect or misconduct.42 Domino's further alleges
33. 164 Conn. 317, 321 A.2d 456 (1973).
34. Id. at 321, 321 A.2d at 458 (the car used to deliver the chicken was owned by the
franchisee).
35. Id.
36. Id. (the franchisee was required by the franchise agreement to purchase or lease an ade-
quate number of delivery vehicles to maintain an adequate delivery service).
37. Id. 321 A.2d at 459 (the court further noted that the franchisee was not an agent of the
franchisor).
38. Id.
39. Sargent, supra note 1.
40. Id.
41. Id. This figure is an estimate.
42. Agency is "the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one
person that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other to so
1991]
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that the 30 minute delivery guarantees are limited to an area of one to
two miles and that their prompt deliveries are a result of fast action in
the kitchen rather than fast driving on city streets.43 Further, drivers are
not docked for late deliveries (tips may well be lower if the pizza is not
hot when it is delivered)." The outcome of the Domino's litigation will
be at a minimum very interesting and may very well influence the future
of franchisor liability in the United States.
B. Liability Based on an Apparent Agency
In a number of franchisor/franchisee relationships the control exerted
by the franchisor over the franchisee will not be deemed sufficient to sup-
port a finding of an agency relationship. Plaintiffs will then seek to estab-
lish the existence of an apparent agency relationship to impose liability
upon a franchisor. The public is frequently led to believe that they are
dealing with a franchisor when they enter a franchise whose signs, logos,
and packaging all refer to a national franchisor without any identification
of a local owner/operator. There are an increasing number of cases
which impose liability on the franchisor in this type of situation. The
Restatement (Second) of Agency Sec. 267 (1975) provides as follows:
One who represents that another is his servant or agent and thereby
causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such
apparent agent is subject to liability to the third person for harm caused
by the lack of care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant or other
agent as if he were such.45
In the Drummond v. Hilton Hotel Corp.' case mentioned above, the
plaintiff asserted that an apparent agency existed. The plaintiff alleged
that "Hilton held itself out to the public in such a manner as to lead the
act." Restatement (Second) of Agency § § 1 (1958). By contrast an independent contractor is "one
who contracts to do something for another, but is not controlled by the other and for whose acts the
other is not responsible.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Continental Shippers Ass'n., 485 F. Supp. 1313, 1316 (N.D. Mo.
1980).
43. Sargent, supra note 1, at 16-17. Attorneys representing plaintiffs suing Domino's are criti-
cal of Domino's delivery system.
Many trial lawyers contend that delivering pizzas hot costs too much in life and limb....
Claimants allege that Domino's drivers, many of them young and inexperienced, have injured
them or killed their family members in their rush to be good employees and back up the guaran-
tee of fast service.... Frank and Mary Jean Kranack, were broadsided on Oct. 5, 1985 by a
Domino's driver who had just pulled out of the store lot en route to a delivery. The store
manager rushed to the scene, Frank said in a July 18 CBS news segment: "He came down, and
he grabbed the pizza out of the Domino driver's car and said, 'Let's get this pizza on the road.'
And I just couldn't believe, with all the damage there, that he's worried about an $8 pizza"....
"Domino's entire system is based on speed. No other company I know of relies on such a
dangerous combination-young drivers and speed."
Id.
44. Id. at 16. A late pizza is generally accounted for as a $3 off coupon.
45. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 267 (1975).
46. 501 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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general public, including hotel guests, to believe they were dealing di-
rectly with either Hilton or a servant or employee of Hilton, a hotel cor-
poration of international reputation." '47 It is interesting to note that the
license/franchise agreement between Hilton and the local owners pro-
vided that the local owners were to disclose to all suppliers and creditors
that they were an independent entity and that Hilton had no liability for
debts. On the other hand, only the name of Hilton was to be displayed in
the guest rooms and public areas of the hotel.48 The court concluded
that these facts gave rise to a factual issue for a jury to decide whether an
apparent agency existed.49
The finding of an apparent agency was recently upheld in an important
and interesting case involving a Holiday Inn franchise. In Crinkley v.
Holiday Inns, Inc.,50 a husband and wife were assaulted and robbed as
they were entering their motel room. The attackers were subsequently
dubbed the "motel bandits" by the media.5 Prior to the attack of the
plaintiffs, the "motel bandits" had attacked a number of motel patrons in
the Charlotte, North Carolina area. The husband suffered multiple
bruises and a severely broken jaw; the wife suffered emotional problems
as well as a heart attack fourteen months after the incident. The plain-
tiffs successfully sued the franchisor on the theory of an apparent
agency.52 Holiday Inns contended that the franchise agreement dis-
claimed any agency relationship. The court held that the denial of liabil-
ity was not determinative of the liability issue." The court noted that
Holiday Inn imposed a number of controls over the franchisee including
the use of the trade name and trademark. The court noted that "the
company engages in national advertising without distinguishing between
company owned and franchised properties." 4 A motel directory also
failed to distinguish company owned properties from franchised proper-
ties. The only indication that the motel was locally owned was a sign
47. Id. at 30. See Chermside, Vicarious Liability of Private Franchisor, 81 A.L.R. 3d 764
(1977).
[A]n agency relationship may arise from acts and appearances which lead others to believe that
such a relationship ha[s] been created[;] ... this concept of apparent authority is based upon
manifestations by the alleged principal to third persons, and reasonable belief by those persons
that the alleged agent is authorized to bind the principal and ... that the manifestations of the
principal [have been] made directly to the third person or [have been] made to the community
by signs or advertising.
Id. at 779-80.
48. 501 F. Supp. at 32.
49. Id.
50. 844 F.2d 156, 159 (4th Cir. 1988) (the franchisor and franchisee were both sued in this
case).
51. Id. at 158.
52. Id. at 166. This case includes an interesting proximate cause problem as the wife sought
recovery for a heart attack which was suffered fourteen months after the motel attack. Id. at 159-63.
53. Id. at 167. See also Drummond v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 501 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
54. 844 F.2d at 166.
19911
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located in the restaurant of the motel." In upholding the judgment
against Holiday Inns, the court noted that a jury could reasonably con-
clude that Holiday Inn-Concord was operated in a way as to create the
appearance that it was owned by Holiday Inns, Inc. and that was one of
the purposes of the franchise agreement.
In order to hold Holiday Inns liable in the Crinkley case, the court had
to distinguish that case from a similar case decided in favor of a motel
franchisor only one year earlier. In Hayman v. Ramada Inn, " a plaintiff
who was a flight attendant was assaulted while a guest at a North Caro-
lina Ramada Inn. The court in that case held that there was insufficient
control present to find a direct agency relationship and further held that
there was no apparent agency relationship." The court held that
Ramada Inn did not attempt to conceal or misrepresent its relationship
with the franchisee. On the contrary, Ramada Inn required the owners
to identify themselves as the owner and operator of the facility. The ma-
jority opinion noted that a sign to this effect was to be "clearly visible"
and displayed "prominently at the front desk."5 Another crucial factor
leading to the judgment in favor of the franchisor was the fact that the
plaintiff failed to show that she relied on any representation of the
franchisor. 9 The plaintiff did not seek to stay at a Ramada Inn because
of their national advertising or reputation. She stayed at the Ramada
Inn because she was required to stay there by her employer as she was an
airline flight attendant trainee. No reliance on the franchisor was
deemed present.' °
The court in Crinkley distinguished the case from Hayman on the ba-
sis that Hayman had no choice but to stay at the Ramada Inn, while in
Crinkley, the plaintiffs voluntarily sought out a Holiday Inn because of
its national reputation. In fact, the Crinkleys had driven twenty miles
north of Charlotte, North Carolina just to stay at a Holiday Inn because
55. Id. at 166-67. The only indication that the Holiday Inn-Concord was not owned by Holi-
day Inns was a sign in the restaurant that stated that the motel was operated by TRAVCO under a
franchise agreement. Id.
56. 86 N.C. App. 274, 357 S.E.2d 394 (1987).
57. Id. at 278-79, 357 S.E.2d at 397-98.
58. Id. at 281, 357 S.E.2d at 399. The dissenting judge questioned whether notice of local
ownership was ever given to customers of the Ramada Inn. The dissenting judge stated: "There is
no evidence that the requirement of the agreement that Turnpike identify itself as owner/operator
was ever followed." Id.
59. Id. at 279, 357 S.E.2d at 398.
60. Id. The Court stated:
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she relied or acted upon any representation of the
defendant. The uncontradicted evidence shows that she was a guest at the facility pursuant to
arrangements made by her employer. There is no allegation in the Complaint or other evidence
in the record that she would have chosen to stay elsewhere or done anything differently had she
known that the facility was not owned and operated by the defendant.
Id.
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the Holiday Inn of their choice was filled to capacity.6 Reliance was
deemed present and the apparent agency was established.
In Broock v. Nutri/System,62 a woman died while participating in a
diet program administered by a local franchisee. The woman's estate
sued the diet system franchisor for her wrongful death. The estate as-
serted an actual agency theory and an apparent agency theory.63 The
court held that there was no actual agency relationship even though the
franchisor, Nutri/System, exerted the following controls over the local
franchise: the right to approve the business site, the establishing the em-
ployee pay scale, preparing of the advertising for employment, and re-
quiring that the franchisee could sell only Nutri/System products. 6  The
court did find that issues of fact remained as to whether an apparent
agency existed or not and whether the plaintiff relied on representations
of the franchisor.65 It was noted that all advertising was done under the
name Nutri/System, that the sign outside the franchise bore only the
name Nutri/System, and that the local telephone directory listed only
the name Nutri/System.66 These facts were deemed to create a genuine
issue of fact as to whether the franchisor represented the local franchisee
as its agent.
C. Liability Based on Claims of Negligence
General negligence principles may lead to franchisor liability. As with
all negligence claims, the four elements of a negligence action must be
established in order to obtain a recovery: the existence of a duty,67
breach of the duty of care,68 proximate cause, 69 and proof of damages.7"
An example of an unsuccessful use of this theory appears in Coty v.
U.S. Slicing Machine Co.." In Coty, a fifteen year old employee of a
Yankee Doodle Dandy restaurant, a fast food franchisee, was injured
while operating a meat slicing machine.7 Under the Fair Labor Stan-
61. 844 F.2d 156, 158.
62. 654 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Ohio 1986). Nutri/System is a weight loss program where the partici-
pants purchase their meals from Nutri/System.
63. id. at 8.
64. Id. at 9.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 320 (1979); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, D.
Owens, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 123 at 164 (5th ed. 1984).
68. See Dimond v. Kling, 221 N.W.2d 86 (N.D. 1974); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 328A
(1979); W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra note 67, at 164.
69. See, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 328A (1979); W. Keeton et al, supra note 67, at
165.
70. W. Keeton et al, supra note 67 at 165.
71. 58 111. App. 3d 237, 373 N.E.2d 1371 (1978).
72. Id. at 239, 373 N.E.2d at 1373.
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dards Act73 the machine involved could only be lawfully operated by
persons over 18 years of age.74 The injured plaintiff sued the franchisor
on a negligent supervision theory. The court held in favor of the
franchisor noting that the franchisor did not have the power under the
franchise agreement to control the day-to-day operations of the fran-
chisee.75 Pursuant to the franchise agreement the franchisee was to com-
ply with federal regulations which would clearly include the Fair Labor
Standards Act.76 The court of appeals was reluctant to hold the
franchisor liable because, pursuant to the franchise agreement, if the
franchisee was in violation of the agreement the franchisor could only
demand a cure of the breach within ten days. If the breach was not
timely cured, the franchisor could terminate the franchise. The court of
appeals felt that the general right to rescind the franchise contract was
insufficient to subject the franchisor to liability.77
In Wise v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 8 a plaintiff successfully
avoided summary judgment on a negligence claim against a franchisor.
In that case, an employee of a New Hampshire Kentucky Fired Chicken
franchise was burned by hot cooking oil from an allegedly defective pres-
sure fryer.7 9 The plaintiff sued the franchisor under a negligence theory,
alleging that the franchisor required the purchase of the fryer, that the
manufacturer of the fryer had informed the franchisor of defects in the
fryer, and that the franchisor had failed to warn the employees of the
defects. The court held that summary judgment was inappropriate and
that the negligence theory should have been decided at trial.8"
A particularly interesting negligence case decided in 1984 involved a 7-
Eleven franchise convenience store. In Cohen v. Southland Corp.,"' a
customer of a 7-Eleven store was shot during an armed robbery of the
store.82 The plaintiff was attempting to stop the robbery when he was
73. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988).
74. Coty, 58 Il. App. at 240, 373 N.E.2d at 1374.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 242, 373 N.E. 2d at 1376. The court stated:
The franchisor, could, therefore, have requested or demanded that the franchisee stop employ-
ing children in the proscribed manner and if the franchisee failed to comply could have termi-
nated the entire franchise agreement. This general right to rescind the contract or "call off the
work" is insufficient, however, under the reasoning of the cited cases to subject the franchisor to
liability under either agency or employer-independent contractor theories.
Id.
78. 555 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.H. 1983).
79. Id. at 992.
80. Id.
81. 157 Cal. App. 3d 130, 203 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1984) (7-Eleven is an all-night franchise conven-
ience store).
82. Id. at 134, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 573. When the robbery occurred, the 7-Eleven employee on
duty fled to a back room of the store and did not come out of the back room until the police arrived.
Id.
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shot. The plaintiff sued the franchisor on a negligence theory alleging
that the franchisor failed to protect store patrons from would-be rob-
bers. 3 The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of the
franchisor. The California Court of Appeals reversed the summary judg-
ment award. The court ruled that a fact question existed as to whether
the franchisor had met the duty of making the store reasonably safe
against criminal activity. Southland, the franchisor, argued that a duty
to make safe was "tantamount to a requirement they hire full-time armed
security guards in the hope of deterring nighttime crime" 4 and that such
a requirement would result in 7-Eleven franchises' economic ruin be-
cause of already existing thin profit margins.85 The court was not moved
by this argument noting that a jury could conclude that much cheaper
security measures (such as adequate lighting, notices of little cash on
hand, and robbery training for employees) could amount to reasonable
precautions.8 6 Factual issues remained as to what precautionary steps
had been taken by the franchisor, thus summary judgment in favor of the
franchisor was inappropriate.8 '
The future use of the negligence theory against franchisors is hard to
predict. The beauty of the common law tort theory of negligence is that
it can be adapted to almost any situation. From a franchisor's perspec-
tive it would appear that negligence liability potential would increase as
franchisor control over franchisee operations increases.88 The more con-
trol exerted over a franchisee, the more likely a duty of care will arise. 89
Whether a franchisor has met the required standard of care will obvi-
ously develop on a case by case basis. In some situations a franchisor
may have to terminate a franchise in order to meet its responsibility of
acting with reasonable care toward the public who deal with the fran-
chisee. 90 Franchisors who fail to terminate franchisees who become in-
solvent or who engage in fraudulent activities may very well face valid
83. Id. at 134, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 573. There was much discussion about the fact that an all-
night convenience store is a popular target for robberies and what strategies were taken by 7-Eleven
to avoid robberies. Id. at 139, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
84. Id. at 142, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
85. Id.
86. Id. As Plaintiff suggests, "keeping a store open in the late evening and early morning hours
invites criminal activity. It is only fair and equitable that the reasonable costs of protecting store
patrons from criminal activity be borne by the owners, the operators and indirectly the patrons of
convenience store and not by the community at large." Id.
87. Id. at 144, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 580. "The adequacy of defendant's measures to protect store
patrons from assault or other threatening behavior of would-be robbers is therefore also a factual
issue to be resolved by a jury." Id.
88. See Golann, In Search of Deeper Pockets.- Theories of Extended Liability, 71 MAss. L. REV.
114 (1986).
89. Id. at 126-27.
90. See Cullen v. BMW of North America, 531 F. Supp. 555 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). In this case, the
plaintiff advanced $18,000 to a franchisee for the purchase of a BMW automobile. The franchisee
never delivered the car, and the plaintiff sued the franchisor for negligence. The court held that the
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negligence claims.9 These situations are particularly troublesome for
franchisors as there are ever increasing numbers of cases against
franchisors alleging wrongful termination of franchise rights.92
V. FRANCHISOR AVOIDANCE OF LIABILITY
Franchisors can take steps to attempt to minimize their potential lia-
bility for the actions of franchisees. One way to minimize liability is to
stay out of the day-to-day business operations of the franchisee. 93 Fran-
chisee manuals should not be so detailed as to deprive franchisees of all
discretion as to how the business is to be run. Company policies which
could require a reckless performance in order to comply with these poli-
cies obviously should be avoided (i.e., 30 minute delivery).
In several cases defense attorneys have raised the Lanham Act as a
defense.94 The basic argument is that the Lanham Act requires certain
actions by franchisors to control franchisees in a way to protect and ad-
minister trademark protections. If the Lanham Act requires controls,
then compliance with the requirements of the Act should not result in
franchisor liability for the actions of the franchisee. Arguably the follow-
ing activities are required by the Lanham Act: supervision of advertis-
ing,95 inspection of premises, 96 control of supplies and suppliers,97
franchisor was aware of the insolvency and unscrupulous business activities of the franchisee and
negligently failed to protect customers of the franchisee. Id. at 558, 565-66.
91. Id. at 565-66. The court stated:
Here, the evidence shows that BMW/NA created a situation which afforded Bavarian the
opportunity to defraud or steal from customers relying on the good reputation of BMW. Cullen
walked into the showroom specifically relying on the publicly displayed BMW logo as repre-
senting a particular level of quality product. The situation here was such as to give him no
notice of any deficiency in the franchise or Bavarian's relationship with BMW. BMW/NA, on
the other hand, was well aware of Bavarian's impairment of BMW's reputation through various
acts... yet it failed to take the available steps to prevent the further misuse of the BMW name
and the misrepresentation that Bavarian continued to be an authorized BMW dealer .... The
facts in evidence show that BMW/NA had knowledge of at least five recent incidents prior to
Cullen's in which Bavarian had received partial payment for automobiles and had not delivered
the cars. . . . BMW/NA was apprised of Bavarian's propensity for unscrupulous business
transactions.
Id.
92. See Blair, Measuring Damages for Lost Profits in Franchise Termination Cases, 8
FRANCHISE L.J. 3 (Fall 1988); Perry & Weinberg, The Federal Antitrust Perspective, 32 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REv. 749 (1987); Note, Franchise Termination: An Analysis of the Implied Covenant of Good
Faith in Franchise Agreements, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 325 (1988).
93. See Golann, supra note 88, at 115; See also Nichols v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 248 Cal. App.
2d 610, 56 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1967).
94. See Monica, supra note 5, at 317; see also Murphy v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 216 Va. 490, 219
S.E.2d 874 (1975).
95. See Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp., 596 F.2d 1322 (7th Cir. 1979); Drexel v. Union Prescrip-
tion Centers, 582 F.2d 781, 787 (3d Cir. 1978); Singleton v. International Dairy Queen, 332 A.2d
160, 162 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975).
96. See Marlin, 596 F.2d 1322 (7th Cir. 1979); Drexel, 582 F.2d at 787; Wood v. Holiday Inns,
508 F.2d 167, 175 (5th Cir. 1975). "Periodic inspections should not alone create an agency relation-
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limitations on the types of products or services sold,a" inspection of
books,99 requirement of financial statements, 'I requirement of periodic
reports,' 0 ' and reservation of the right to terminate the franchise agree-
ment for noncompliance with contract terms.'0 2 Franchisors who are
exerting no more than these Lanham Act controls will have a strong
argument that there is no actual agency relationship. Plaintiffs seeking to
establish an actual agency situation will seek to establish controls which
go beyond these minimal controls.
Franchisors have frequently tried to rely upon franchise contract pro-
visions disclaiming any agency relationship. The contract will typically
assert an independent contractor relationship between the franchisor and
the franchisee. These contract clauses are almost always ignored and the
court will review the factual situation rather than relying upon the par-
ties characterization of their relationship.
0 3
The apparent authority cases discussed above should stress to
franchisors the importance of clearly disclosing to the public which busi-
nesses are locally owned and which businesses are company owned. This
would appear especially important in franchise operations which are not
commonly thought of as being independently operated. A hotel
franchise would appear to be a good example of a franchise which is
commonly thought of as not being franchised. Most people probably are
aware of the fact that McDonald's restaurants are local franchises,
whereas Hilton Hotels are commonly thought of as being company
owned. Franchisors should start requiring that local franchisees place
their name on signs, letterheads, and packages, to clearly indicate that
the business is locally owned and operated. This would certainly make it
more difficult to establish an apparent agency theory as it would be diffi-
cult to establish the necessary reliance on the part of the consumer. 10' It
would seem that the indication of the name of the franchisee would be
ship. The appearance of the premises from which the trademarked product or service is delivered to
the public is important to maintaining the quality of the trademark." Monica, supra note 5, at 321.
97. See, e.g., Singleton, 332 A.2d at 162; Slates v. International House of Pancakes, 90 Ill. App.
3d. 716, 767, 413 N.E.2d 457, 465 (1980).
98. See, e.g., Billops v. Magness Constr. Co., 391 A.2d 196, 198 (Del. 1978); Stanford v. Dairy
Queen Prods., 623 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
99. Inspection of books is almost universally used in franchisor/franchisee contracts, especially
if the franchise fee includes a percentage of gross sales. See Drexel, 582 F.2d at 787.
100. See, e.g., Drexel, 582 F.2d 781; Murphy, 216 Va. at 494, 219 S.E.2d at 877.
101. Murphy v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 216 Va. 490, 494, 219 S.E.2d 874, 877 (1975).
102. See Wood v. Holiday Inns, 508 F.2d 167, 175 (5th Cir. 1975); Singleton v. International
Dairy Queen, 332 A.2d 160 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975); Coty v. United States Slicing Mach. Co., 58 Ill.
App. 3d. 237, 373 N.E.2d 1371, 1374 (1978).
103. See Drummond v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 501 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
104. See, e.g., Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 844 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1988); Hayman v. Ramada
Inn, 86 N.C. App. 274, 357 S.E.2d 394 (1987).
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easy to require and would have little negative impact upon the consum-
ing public.
It is impossible to list steps which can be taken to avoid negligence
lawsuits against franchisors. The obvious solution is to act reasonably
under the circumstances at all times. This simplistic approach is no
doubt the best defense to negligence lawsuits.
VI. CONCLUSION
At the present time, franchisor liability law is still evolving. It is diffi-
cult to accurately predict the future extent of franchisor liability. It ap-
pears inevitable that there will be an increasing number of lawsuits
against franchisors-whether for good or for bad-and franchisors need
to be aware of the risks so they can plan accordingly.
The issue of how much control a franchisor should exert over the ac-
tions of a franchisee is particularly perplexing. Our legal system needs to
give specific directions to franchisors as to what is expected of a
franchisor. A legal system which sometimes imposes liability and some-
times protects the franchisor sends a confusing message to franchisors.
Frustrated franchisors then attempt to walk a tightrope whereby they
exercise some control, but not too much control so as to avoid liability.
A clear requirement of greater liability would encourage increased
franchisor involvement in business operations and would arguably result
in safer business operations.
If franchisors react positively to increasing responsibilities and exert
positive controls over franchise operations, perhaps injuries and mishaps
will decrease and the social goal of safe and efficient business activities
will result.
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